

Chapter 2

Offensive Operations

Urban combat isolates and separates units. Operations are reduced to a series of small-unit actions, placing a premium on small-unit leadership, initiative, and skill.

2001. Introduction. The Marine Corps' maneuver warfare philosophy guides the conduct of offensive operations in MOUT. This warfighting philosophy serves to guide commanders through the development, planning, and execution of missions. A detailed discussion of maneuver warfare can be found in MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, MCDP 1-3, *Tactics*, MCWP 3-1, *Ground Combat Operations* (under development), and other Marine Corps doctrinal publications.

This chapter focuses only on offensive operations in an urban environment where collateral damage is of minimal concern. It describes tactics, techniques and procedures to be employed for seizing and clearing buildings and other urbanized areas. Chapter 6 addresses some considerations associated with fighting under constraints and restraints on urbanized terrain.

Section I

Planning

2101. Considerations. Identification of the adversary's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities will allow the commander to focus his efforts on those portions of the built-up area essential for mission accomplishment.

a. Reasons for Attacking a Built-Up Area. A commander considers the following before deciding to attack a built-up area:

(1) Tactical Advantage. Cities control key routes of commerce and provide a tactical advantage to the commander who controls them. Control of features such as bridges, railways, and road networks can have a significant impact on future operations. Urbanized areas may be used by the enemy as a base of operations from which they launch their own offensive operations. It may be advantageous to attack those bases and separate the enemy from their support infrastructure.

(2) Political Advantage. The political importance of a built-up area may justify the use of time and resources to liberate it. Capturing a city could destroy the seat of local and national government. At the very least, it could deal the enemy a decisive psychological blow.

(3) Economical Advantage. The destruction or capture of key industrial and commercial cities with the resulting denial of production and distribution of equipment and supplies strikes at the enemy's future ability to wage war. The requirement for a logistics base,

especially a port or airfield, may play a pivotal role in the enemy's ability to continue the conflict. Capture of such cities may prove extremely beneficial to the attackers, who can use these resources to their advantage.

(4) Potential Threats to Operations

(a) Enemy Threat Too Great To Bypass. Though the terrain around a built-up area may facilitate its bypass, the enemy within that urbanized area may remain a threat capable of interdicting lines of communications. This may require the enemy force to be contained or destroyed.

(b) Terrain Does Not Allow Bypass. The urbanized area may sit between two natural slopes on the avenue of approach and thus require capture in order to secure the main supply route. Additionally, the urbanized area, itself, may sit on dominating terrain that threatens combat support and CSS elements.

b. Reasons for Not Attacking a Built-Up Area. The commander considers the following reasons for not attacking a built-up area:

(1) Built-Up Area Not Required To Support Future Operations. The attacker may have adequate supply support and resources established at another site from which combat forces can be supported. Therefore, during the estimate process, commanders may assess that the urbanized area is not necessary to support future operations.

(2) Enemy Not a Threat. The commander may decide to bypass upon determination that no substantial threat exists in the built-up area that could affect the unit's ability to accomplish its mission.

(3) Time or Risk Unacceptable. The commander's intent may dictate that speed of movement is essential to the mission. Because MOUT can be time-consuming, the commander may choose to bypass the urbanized area to maintain tempo. Furthermore, the potential for numerous casualties, the expenditure of critical resources, or the restrictions placed on attacking forces may result in unacceptable risks to the commander's primary mission.

(4) Declared an Open City. The area may have been declared an "open city" because it is undefended or of religious or historical significance. By international agreements, open cities are demilitarized and must be neither defended nor attacked. (See HR, 25, Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, *Embodying Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land*, 18 October 1907.) The attacking force must assume civil administrative control and treat the civilians as noncombatants in an occupied country. The defender must immediately evacuate and cannot arm the civilian population. A city can be declared open only before it is attacked. Other reasons for not defending could be the presence of large numbers of noncombatants, hospitals, or wounded personnel or the city's cultural, religious, or historical significance.

2102. Commander's Estimate. Once assigned the mission to attack a built-up area, a thorough mission analysis is conducted. Marines follow the same planning process in MOU as for other operational environments by evaluating the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available (METT-T). Based on METT-T and application of maneuver warfare concepts, the commander can decide on a plan that defeats the enemy by exploiting identified critical vulnerabilities. The commander may not have sufficient forces to fight everywhere and so must focus on the enemy and concentrate resources to decisive ends. This may involve making conscious decisions to accept risk at some place or time and to seize opportunities at others. The challenges of an urbanized environment dictate an even greater need to fully understand maneuver warfare.

This section addresses METT-T considerations as they pertain to the offense in urban warfare. METT-T is covered in detail in MCRP 3-11.5A, *Marine Troop Leader's Guide*.

a. Mission. Mission analysis is the first step of the estimate process. One of the important mission analysis considerations in urban conflict is the scope of clearance required to accomplish the mission. Commanders and planners should ask themselves the following questions:

- Do I need to clear every building?
- Should I clear only certain blocks?
- Should I only control certain areas?
- What level of protection is required for my lines of communication?

b. Enemy. Maneuver warfare focuses on the enemy. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process should be used to analyze the enemy and terrain in detail. (See Field Manual (FM) 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*.) The commander decides whether threat forces are conventional or unconventional.

(1) Conventional Forces. Most potential adversaries have adopted techniques of urban combat from either the United States or the former Soviet Union. Therefore, potential adversaries will build their urban defense to counter the attack of a combined arms force. Potential enemy forces will normally organize their defense in depth. Prepared strong points will usually form the perimeter of a larger defense while reserves locate in a separate position within the perimeter. You can expect ambushes to fill gaps in the perimeter while dummy strongpoints are established to deceive the attacker. Positions for securing the entrances to and exits from underground structures and routes are normally established. Security positions will normally be located forward of first-echelon defensive positions.

(2) Unconventional Forces. Urban areas have become a haven for unconventional forces. The large noncombatant population provides cover and concealment for unconventional

force operations. Conventional forces operating in MOUT will normally be placed under restrictive ROE to minimize collateral damage. Unconventional forces will often use our restrictive ROE and the noncombatant population to their advantage when devising an urban defense. (See FM 34-130, FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict*, and Chapter 6 of this manual.)

c. Terrain and Weather

(1) Terrain. Offensive operations should be tailored to the urban environment based on a detailed analysis of urbanized terrain (see Appendix I). Commanders and subordinate leaders use **KOCSA** (**k**ey terrain, **o**bservation and fields of fire, **c**over and concealment, **o**bstacles, and **a**venues of approach) to identify important terrain factors:

(a) K: Key Terrain. Key terrain surrounding an urban area can facilitate entry or deny escape. Within the city, airports or airfields, stadiums, parks, sports fields, school playgrounds, public buildings, road junctions, bridges, or industrial facilities may be key terrain.

Critical public buildings are identified during the terrain-analysis phase of an IPB. Hospitals, clinics, and surgical facilities are important because the laws of war prohibit their attack when not being used for military purposes other than medical support. The locations of civil defense, air raid shelters, and food supplies are critical in dealing with civilian affairs. Additionally, population size, locations, and density; density of the built-up area; firefighting capabilities; the location of hazardous materials; police and security capabilities; civil evacuation plans; and key public buildings should be identified.

(b) O: Observation and Fields of Fire. Urbanized terrain is characterized by restrictive observation and fields of fire. Weapon ranges can be greatly reduced because of buildings and other manmade structures. On the other hand, high ground or tall buildings can provide perches which enhance line of sight (LOS) for observation and communications as well as for individual and crew-served weapons. This includes man-portable surface-to-air missiles.

(c) C: Cover and Concealment. Buildings, sewers, and subways can provide excellent cover and concealment for enemy and friendly forces. They also provide covered and/or concealed maneuver routes within the built-up area. The civilian population can also offer cover and concealment to enemy forces.

(d) O: Obstacles. Natural or manmade obstacles restrict or deny maneuver within the urban area. Bridges, walls/fences, canals, streams, rivers, as well as rubble created by the effects of weapons should be thoroughly analyzed. Construction sites and commercial operations such as lumberyards, brickyards, steelyards, and railroad maintenance yards are primary sources of obstacle and barrier construction materials.

These sites can also supply engineers with materials to strengthen existing obstacles or to set up antitank hedgehogs or crib-type roadblocks.

(e) A: Avenues of Approach. Avenues to the city should support maneuver and be concealed either by terrain, darkness, smoke, or a combination of the three. Avenues that canalize or choke maneuver, due to the density of built-up area or natural terrain, should be identified and avoided. Roads, rivers, streams, and bridges provide high-speed avenues for movement. **Generally, military maps do not provide enough detail for urbanized terrain analysis.** They usually do not show the underground sewer system, subways, underground water system, mass transit routes, and power plants. Local maps of intracity road networks and subway systems and city hall/department of public works blueprints of all city buildings (if available), coupled with aerial photos, should be used.

(2) Weather. As in any military operation, weather affects equipment, terrain, and visibility, but its greatest impact is on the individual Marine. Snow, ice, dust, wind, rain, humidity, and temperature extremes reduce human efficiency. Weather extremes coupled with stress and the physical strain of urban combat can be minimized with effective small-unit leadership. Weather factors include:

(a) Precipitation. Rain or melting snow may flood basements and subway systems. This is especially true when automatic pumping facilities that normally handle rising water are deprived of power. Flooding makes storm and other sewer systems hazardous or impassable. In an NBC environment, chemical agents can be washed into underground systems by precipitation. As a result, these systems may contain chemical agent concentrations that are much higher than surface areas and thus become contaminated “hot spots.” Hot spot effects become more pronounced as agents are absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls.

(b) Fog. Many major cities experience fog, especially those located in low-lying areas and along canals or rivers. Industrial and transportation areas are the most likely to be affected by fog because of their proximity to waterways. Fog adversely affects vision and optical aids. It may also be used to help conceal friendly movement.

(c) Inversion Layers. Air inversion layers are common over cities, especially cities located in low-lying “bowls” or in river valleys. Inversion layers trap dust, smoke, chemical agents, and other pollutants, reducing visibility and often creating a greenhouse effect, which raises ground and air temperatures.

(d) Temperature. Built-up areas are often warmer than surrounding open areas during both summer and winter. This difference can be as great as 10 to 20 degrees hotter throughout the year.

(e) Wind Effects. Generally, wind chill is not as pronounced in built-up areas. However, the configuration of streets, especially in the city core and outlying high-rise

areas, can cause wind tunneling. This increases the effects of the wind along streets that parallel the wind direction, while cross-streets remain relatively well protected. Wind tunneling can have a negative impact on aviation support within the urbanized area by creating dangerous wind effects down streets and between buildings.

(f) Day/Night Differences. Night and periods of reduced visibility favor surprise, which in turn, may facilitate infiltration, detailed reconnaissance, attacks across open areas, seizure of defended strongpoints, and reduction of defended obstacles. Because of the difficulties of night navigation in restrictive terrain (usually without reference points and in close proximity to the enemy) forces may consider using simple maneuver plans with easily recognizable objectives.

Rotary-wing aircraft are best utilized at night when operating on urbanized terrain. The most effective method of protecting helicopters from a successful engagement by hostile ground forces is to remain unseen. During night flights, the use of night vision goggles (NVGs) should be weighed carefully. Artificial lights can render NVGs partially ineffective and can increase the possibility of mid-air collisions by degrading the goggles to the point where nearby aircraft and aerial obstructions are not seen.

(g) Aviation Weather Considerations. Weather conditions can be a critical factor in determining the amount of aviation support the aviation combat element can provide in an urbanized area. Aviation forces should consider the following:

- Presence or absence of fog, industrial haze, low clouds, heavy rain, and other factors that limit visibility for pilots
- Illumination and moon phase/angle during night vision goggle operations
- Ice, sleet, and freezing rain that degrade aerodynamic efficiency
- Updrafts and downdrafts in the urban canyon that may present an unpredictable hazard
- High temperatures and/or high-density altitudes that degrade aircraft engine performance and lift capability
- High winds (large gust spreads) and crosswinds, to include the tunneling effect, that may create localized and unpredictable hazards to aviation
- Weather conditions that create hazards on pick-up zones and LZs, such as blowing dust, sand, or snow.

d. Troops and Support Available. The commander must be aware of all of his combat power (e.g., types of weapons systems, their numbers, and their capabilities) when performing analysis for operations in a built-up area. In the initial planning phase, force size must be evaluated in relation to urban size, enemy forces, and mission assignment. In the attack of a built-up area (population 100,000+), the GCE of a MEF would be a Marine division. However, in the initial stages of an amphibious or MPF operation, a reinforced infantry battalion or regiment may provide the initial forces. No matter what the size GCE, operations will be conducted by task-organized, reinforced battalions and their companies/platoons. Therefore, by using the infantry battalion as the basis for projecting the size of an overall force, the number of regiments or divisions required to secure a built-up area can be determined. Whatever size MAGTF is required for operations in an urbanized area, much of the fighting may be generally conducted by small teams of Marines. Consequently, our success in urban fighting may largely depend upon small unit and individual tactical skills. Specifically, leaders at all levels must analyze the following factors:

- Number and type of available units
- Task organization for urban combat (See Appendix A.)
- Availability of critical weapons systems
- State of training and discipline (training for urban warfare is imperative)
- Strength in terms of men and materiel in relation to enemy and size of built-up area
- Aviation support available
- State of maintenance and supplies
- Available combat support (based on availability and mission requirements)
- Available CSS (critical logistical and maintenance items)
- Host nation support available. (If the city's occupants are friendly to the attacker, then support in intelligence, deception, and diversion may be possible.)

e. Time Available. The following issues should be considered when analyzing the time available for an attack on urbanized terrain:

- A significant amount of time is required for clearing buildings, blocks, or axes of advance.
- Marines tire more quickly when clearing buildings because of stress and additional physical exertion.

- Adequate time should be allocated for thorough reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsals. Ultimately, this can result in higher tempo in the execution of the plan.


Once an estimate of the situation (using METT-T) has been conducted, planning for offensive operations can proceed. It is important to remember that the initial estimate of the situation must be continually updated throughout the planning process and the conduct of operations to account for changes in METT-T. (See MCWP 5-1 *Marine Corps Planning* [under development])

2103. Phases of the Attack. Attacks are categorized as either hasty or deliberate. Both hasty and deliberate attacks should take advantage of as much planning, reconnaissance, and coordination as time and the situation permit. Regardless of the size of the attacking force or of the objective to be secured, the phases of the attack (i.e. reconnoiter, isolate, secure foothold, and control the objective) remain constant.

a. Deliberate Attack. A deliberate attack *is a type of offensive action characterized by preplanned coordinated employment of firepower and maneuver to close with and destroy or capture the enemy* (Jt Pub 1-02). It is a fully coordinated operation that employs the MAGTF's combined arms team against the enemy's defense. It is used when enemy positions are well prepared, when the built-up area is large or severely congested, or when the element of surprise is lost. Given the nature of urbanized terrain, the deliberate attack of a built-up area is similar to the assault of a strongpoint (see MCWP 3-1, *Ground Combat Operations* [under development]). The deliberate attack of a built-up area is conducted in the following phases:

(a) Phase I: Reconnoiter the Objective. Intelligence gathering and reconnaissance/surveillance are critical to the planning process and success of the operation. All available intelligence resources should be used to gain vital information on the enemy. Whenever possible, a leader makes a personal reconnaissance of the objective area to collect first-hand information regarding the area to be attacked. A thorough reconnaissance yields a wealth of information to use in the continued development of the plan. Avenues of approach, observation posts (OPs), supply routes, and the emplacement positions of direct- and indirect-fire weapons systems are all examples of information that may be amassed during the reconnaissance of the objective area. Composition and structure of buildings and roadbeds, cover and concealment opportunities, and other information not apparent in a map study may have a significant impact on the plan.

(b) Phase II: Isolate the Objective. The objective can be isolated by seizing natural and man-made features that dominate the area. Isolation may also be accomplished by coordinated use of supporting arms to seal off enemy lines of communication. This phase may be conducted simultaneously with Phase III (securing a foothold). Figure 2-1 shows a task-organized, reinforced infantry battalion isolating the objective.




(c) **Phase III: Secure a Foothold.** Once the objective is isolated, a foothold should be secured as soon as possible in order to maintain tempo. The seizure of a foothold provides the attacking force with a position from which they can continue the assault through the objective area. The assault is supported by direct and indirect suppressive fires and smoke. Figure 2-2 (pg. 2-10) shows the battalion objective being isolated. One company is providing suppressive fires while another company seizes an initial foothold. Fire support assets are providing suppressive fires on the objective.

Figure 2-1. Isolation of the Objective Area

(d) **Phase IV: Seizing the Objective.** Once a foothold is seized and consolidated, supporting forces move to the built-up area to support the seizing of the objective area. To maintain tempo, the transition between the phases should be seamless. Once the foothold has been established, forward units continue the attack through the objective area. Supporting units assist as required. The momentum of the assault is continued until the objective area is cleared or controlled.

The assault force should establish limited objectives to ensure that the attacking forces do not get strung out along the axis of advance. Gaps may give the enemy the opportunity to infiltrate along the line of advance or make isolated friendly forces vulnerable to attack.




This phase also includes consolidation of the objective area and reorganization for future taskings. By setting limited objectives, the attacking forces have an opportunity to reorganize and defend against counterattacks while maintaining momentum. Once the limited objectives have been secured, the urbanized area may be sectorized for detailed clearing. Clearing by sectors may help in the allocation of forces and in the prevention of fratricide. In addition to defensive preparation against counterattack, preparation should be made for follow-on missions (e.g., restoration of civilian facilities, marking and clearing minefields, etc.).

Figure 2-2. Seizing a Foothold

Seizing may consist of a systematic house-by-house, block-by-block advance through the entire zone of action, or it may be a rapid advance through a lightly defended area to seize a key objective. The difference between the two techniques is made by the commander on the basis of mission requirements and METT-T analysis. Seizing an objective in urbanized terrain requires detailed planning, coordination, decentralized command and control, and small-unit execution. It is a continuation of the assault until all mission requirements are met.

(1) **Rapid Advance.** Rapid advance (Figure 2-3) may be used to maintain




momentum through the zone of action and to seize key objectives. Some enemy positions may be isolated or bypassed in order to maintain tempo. This procedure may be used when:

- A key objective is identified (an enemy critical vulnerability or an objective that supports the friendly scheme of maneuver)
- Time is critical in reaching the objective
- Only selected buildings on the route of advance require clearing.

Figure 2-3. Rapid Advance En Route to a Key Objective

(2) **Systematic Clearance.** Systematic clearance (figure 2-4 on pg. 2-12) involves the deliberate reduction of all significant enemy positions throughout the objective area. It is usually used when time is not a critical factor.



b. Hasty Attack. A hasty attack is, *in land operations, an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed in order to exploit an opportunity* (Jt Pub 1-02). Normally, hasty attacks are conducted as a result of unexpected contact during movement through the built-up area or when an opportunity for exploitation presents itself. Upon contact, the commander immediately deploys, returns fire, reports the contact and situation, develops the situation, and chooses a course of action. The hasty attack follows the same four phases as the deliberate attack; however, the time between preparation and response is compacted.


2104. Warfighting Functions. The warfighting functions (WFs) encompass all activities in the battlespace. Planners consider and integrate the warfighting functions when analyzing how best

Figure 2-4. Systematic Clearance Within Assigned Sectors

to accomplish the mission. The WFs include maneuver, intelligence, fires, logistics, command and control, and force protection.

a. Command and Control. The commander positions himself where he can best observe and influence the battle. Positioning is relative to the level of command. For example, a squad leader locates where he can observe and direct his fire teams, while the battalion commander locates where he can observe and direct his companies.

Close-quarter fighting in and around buildings makes command and control exceedingly difficult. Commanders and small-unit leaders rely on guidance and intent provided by higher



headquarters to facilitate decentralized execution while maintaining control and direction. In close-quarter fighting, commanders may have to rely upon messengers to communicate with their units and higher headquarters.

At battalion and higher levels, command and control is accomplished through three command echelons, which can be collocated or echeloned across the battlefield. The three echelons are tactical, main, and rear (see fig. 2-5). Each echelon may have a combat operations center (COC) capability. The COCs are the facilities (buildings, vehicles, or tents) used by the commander or staff at each echelon to plan, direct, control, and coordinate operations.

Figure 2-5. Tactical, Main, and Rear Echelons

(1) Tactical Echelon. The tactical echelon is normally collocated with the main echelon until the situation dictates separation. When the tactical echelon separates, designated command group members displace forward. Normally, the commander will move with the tactical echelon. The tactical echelon must have the communications and mobility necessary to allow the commander to exercise command. This echelon is usually small in size so the commander and command group can quickly displace forward to observe and influence actions. Organization of the tactical echelon should be addressed in the unit's standing operating procedures (SOPs).

(2) Main Echelon. The main echelon contains a COC, which is the nerve center for command and control of battalion through division-sized organizations. A COC consists of the command group (primary staff members with support personnel) and possesses the necessary mobility and communications for command and control of tactical operations. The main echelon COC monitors the battle, coordinates fire support, issues orders, maintains communications with subordinates and higher and adjacent commands, conducts current and future tactical plans, and assists the commander and subordinate commanders as appropriate. On urbanized terrain, the main echelon COC is normally located in buildings that provide good communications with subordinates and higher and adjacent commands. The command post (CP) is where the commander is physically located. Therefore, the CP can be located at any of the three echelons based on the commander's presence.

(3) Rear Echelon. The rear echelon's COC consists of the logistical and administrative personnel required to plan, coordinate, and execute logistics support. During urban warfare, the rear echelon COC is usually closer to combat forces than normal as it uses the city's captured buildings and facilities to provide cover and concealment for stocking supplies, conducting maintenance repair, and treating the injured.

Attack of a built-up area requires detailed planning due to restrictive terrain, close proximity to opposing forces, fire coordination requirements, and reduced communications capability. The GCE will frame a centralized plan of attack, fire support, and logistics support to conduct urban operations. However, the actual attack of a built-up area is a series of isolated, close-quarter battles carried out by small units. The execution of these attacks should be decentralized.

Communications planning procedures, as outlined in MCWP 6-22, *Communications and Information Systems* (under development), are applicable to the urban battle. Planners should be meticulous in their scrutiny of the environment and the effect it will have on communications. Manmade structures can create problems for single-channel radios. These structures inhibit LOS radio communications by absorbing or reflecting transmitted signals. However, the urban environment may have exploitable advantages such as the availability of

electrical power, commercial telecommunications networks, and environmental control systems. Electrical power generation stations and other emergency power systems are normally found in protected structures and are probably usable. Due to their value to the enemy, these areas are more likely to be heavily defended. Enclosed areas offer excellent concealment and protection of communications and other command and control support equipment. Extensive commercial communications networks composed of miles of underground protected cable connecting central telephone exchanges are likely to be available, as well as a multitude of public service radio nets (police, fire, civil defense, taxi, etc.) complete with existing antenna systems and retransmission stations. To communicate effectively and continuously, commanders must minimize limitations imposed by the urban environment and maximize the advantage of existing civil communications.

b. Intelligence. Collection of intelligence information on urbanized terrain is difficult. Urbanized terrain provides overhead cover and concealment from observation by aircraft, reconnaissance personnel, and satellites.

(1) Information Requirements. In addition to information about the location of enemy units, nature of the terrain, trafficability of roads, etc., that all operations require, urban warfare requires detailed information on the following:

- Population density, characteristics, and culture
- Location and quality of water supply
- Width and construction of streets
- Layout of road networks
- Location, width, and load capacity of bridges
- Layout of underground networks such as subways, sewers, and utility ducts
- Types and construction of buildings
- Location of key communications and transportation facilities
- Location of canals and waterways.

Information on port facilities should include details on harbor sites, pier networks, unloading capabilities, warehouse/dockside facilities, harbor currents, and sandbars or other midstream obstructions.

(2) Collection. Accurate, detailed, and timely information is vital to the success of any urban operation. Collection operations conducted by national intelligence organizations may provide valuable information on the layout of the city, recent changes to

transportation routes, political affiliations of various groups, and locations of military units. This information needs to be current and must be verified and updated as attacking forces close on the city. Reconnaissance activities such as the study of large-scale maps, aerial photographs, and background intelligence reports keep the commander's information current. The latest information on the enemy and the terrain should be continuously fed to the intelligence section using long-range reconnaissance patrols, human intelligence (HUMINT) reports, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) missions, and electronic intelligence. Use of reconnaissance assets should be tempered with a risk-versus-gain judgment. Reconnaissance assets should not be risked indiscriminately if the information can be collected by other means.

(3) Maps. Tactical maps should be supplemented by city street maps that contain street names and information on the location of important buildings and transportation terminals. These city street maps should be distributed to all units operating within the city. Although tactical maps are key in controlling fire support missions, simple street maps assist ground troops in maintaining their orientation within the city and in tracking buildings and areas that have been cleared.

c. Maneuver. Maneuver is the employment of forces on the urban battlespace through movement in combination with fire or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage (see MCWP 3-1). Maneuver is an essential element of combat power. Maneuver in itself cannot produce decisive results. Combined with mass, offensive action, economy of force, and surprise, maneuver provides favorable conditions for closing with the enemy. Maneuver contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative, exploiting success, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability. It is through maneuver that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place. In many cases, maneuver is made possible only through the control of tempo and effective employment of firepower. The commander integrates supporting fires with the scheme of maneuver to create a dilemma for the enemy. Likewise, movement without fires exposes the force to effective enemy counteraction and risks losing the initiative and momentum. Maneuver that does not include violent action against the enemy will not be decisive. At all levels, successful application of this principle in the urban environment requires flexible and innovative plans and actions.

(1) Infantry/Armor Movement. Armored vehicles are vulnerable in built-up areas where streets and alleys provide ready-made fire lanes for defenders. Motorized traffic is greatly restricted, canalized, and vulnerable to ambush and close-range fire. Tanks are at a further disadvantage because their main guns cannot be depressed sufficiently to fire into basements or be elevated to fire into upper floors of buildings at close range (Figure 2-11). Whenever tanks are used in the direct-fire role, infantry must provide security against enemy ground attack. Movement of armor down narrow streets or down narrow paths through debris requires close coordination with infantry. Infantry and armor may use bounding overwatch techniques during movement (See MCWP 3-12, *Marine Tank Employment* [under development]). With this technique, infantry moves ahead of armored vehicles to clear the buildings on each side. Lead infantry units should not get so far ahead of armor that mutual support is lost. Conversely, if armor gets too far ahead of infantry, it

may be quickly damaged or destroyed. Coordinated movement also contains a rear security element to protect armor from behind.

During movement down a street tanks should deploy with one tank on each side of the street focusing on the street and lower levels of buildings. *In MOUT, tanks are best deployed in pairs.* Other tanks of the tank platoon or section should move behind the infantry and fire at targets in the upper stories of buildings. When space is inadequate to deploy abreast, tanks may deploy in single file. Movement across open areas should be well coordinated to ensure mutual support. Suppression fire and smoke are used to cover force movements.

Armor can also be used in the reduction of obstacles. For example, grappling hooks and ropes attached to a tank can be used to pull down wire obstacles.

(2) Cover and Concealment. Walls and buildings can provide cover, concealment, and protection from enemy ATGM or heavy machine gun fire. Before armor enters a building, infantry should clear the building and check the ground floors to ensure that there is no basement into which an armored vehicle could fall and become trapped.

Tank and AAV generated smoke may be useful in concealing the location and movement of assaulting forces. Additionally, the thermal sights of the tank are very effective as they can use heat differentials to detect the movement or presence of concealed enemy soldiers, weapons, and vehicles.


(3) Tactical Considerations for Helicopterborne Movement. Helicopterborne operations are planned and conducted using the same combat fundamentals that apply to ground operations. However, there are considerations that apply only to helicopterborne operations. See MCWP 3-24, *Assault Support* (under development) for a detailed discussion on helicopterborne operations. These considerations include:

(a) Helicopterborne forces, once they have landed, lack vehicular mobility and heavy weapons. For this reason, it is important that the forces land on or near the objective. Such a force may be isolated for a time pending linkup with ground forces.

(b) Helicopters may be used for tactical deception. Helicopters may be used to make demonstration landings in several different zones to deceive the enemy as to the true objective of an operation.

(c) Helicopterborne assaults are normally conducted against undefended or lightly defended objectives. When attacking a well-defended objective, an LZ should be selected which provides cover and concealment for the assault force and is close to the objective.


(d) Helicopterborne forces are vulnerable to attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. To counter this vulnerability, friendly attack helicopters



escort the helicopterborne forces during air movement, and indirect fires are used to suppress or neutralize enemy air defenses.

(4) Control Measures. The following control measures assist in the maneuver of forces in MOUT:

(a) Objectives. When attacking to seize a foothold, the infantry unit may assign subordinate units the first block of buildings as their first objective. When an objective extends to a street, only the near side of the street is included. The final objective may be buildings or key terrain at the far edge of the built-up area. Key buildings, or groups



of buildings, may also be assigned as intermediate objectives. Buildings along the route of attack should be identified by numbers for clarification (Figure 2-6 on page 2-18).

During the seizing phase, bypassing buildings may increase the risk of attack from the rear or flank. It may be necessary for the unit to enter, search, and clear each building

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in its zone of action. A single building may be an objective for a rifle squad or, if the building is large, for a rifle platoon or company. When the commander's concept of operations is based on speed (rapid advance method) or when the force is conducting a hasty attack, a unit may be directed to bypass certain positions within its zone.




Figure 2-6. Objectives and Numbering System

(b) Phase Lines. Phase lines are control measures used to report progress or to control the advance of attacking units. Phase lines should be oriented on readily identifiable terrain features such as principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines. They should be placed on the near side of a street or open area. In an attack, a unit may have the mission to seize positions in its zone of action up to a particular phase line. (Figure 2-7).

Figure 2-7. Phase Lines

(c) Boundaries. Unit boundaries are used to define zones of action and are usually set within blocks so that a street is included in the zone. Both sides of a street should be included within the same unit's boundaries.

(d) Checkpoints and Contact Points. Checkpoints aid in reporting locations and controlling movement. Contact points are used to designate specific points where units make physical contact. Checkpoints and contact points are designated by each unit as appropriate for command and control at street corners, buildings, railway crossings, bridges, or any other easily identifiable feature.

(e) Attack Position and Line of Departure (LD). A designated attack position may be occupied by forward units for last-minute preparation and coordination. The attack

position is often behind or inside the last large building before crossing the LD. The LD should be located on the near side of an open area running perpendicular to the direction of attack, such as a street or rail line.

(5) Time of Attack. Ideally, the time of attack should be conducted during hours of darkness or limited visibility. Marines can exploit the poor visibility to cross open areas, to gain access to rooftops, to infiltrate enemy areas, and to gain a foothold. When attacking in unrestricted visibility, units should use smoke to conceal movement.

(6) Reserve. Reserves should be mobile and usually follow in trace of forward units. Battalion reserves normally follow one to two blocks to the rear of the lead company. If a company reserve is available, it follows within the same block so that it can immediately influence the attack. A unit with a reserve mission can be called upon to:


- Exploit an enemy weakness or friendly success
- Attack from another direction
- Attrit and/or clear bypassed enemy positions (normally requires designation of a new reserve)
- Secure the rear or a flank
- Maintain contact with adjacent units
- Counterattack

(7) Security. Each unit should ensure security of its flanks and rear (Figure 2-8 on page 2-20). Fighting in a built-up area is unique in that attacks can come from all three dimensions. Units assigned a mission to isolate can also provide security. Small units conduct security patrols and man OPs to supplement higher level reconnaissance and security operations.

Figure 2-8. Enemy Firing From Flank

(8) Engineers. Leading units should have engineers attached for immediate support. Tasks commonly assigned to engineers include:

- Preparing and using explosives to breach walls and obstacles
- Finding and exploding mines in place or helping to remove them



- Cratering roads and performing other countermobility measures
- Clearing rubble and obstacles

Requirements for engineer support in MOUT normally exceed capabilities. To compensate, all Marines should receive basic demolition training prior to conducting urban operations.

d. Fires. The attack of a built-up area may require extensive air and artillery preparation prior to the ground attack. Supporting fires suppress the defender's fire, restricts his movement, and possibly destroys his position. Consideration should be given to the rubble effect produced by aerial and artillery bombardment. The assault should closely follow air and artillery fire to exploit its immediate effect on the defender. Maneuver units move near the final coordination line while the enemy is engaged by supporting fires. As the attacking force assaults, supporting fires lift and/or shift to block enemy withdrawal or to prevent the enemy from reinforcing their position. (See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion on air and artillery support during urban warfare.) Fire can be categorized into indirect and direct fires.

(1) Indirect Fire

(a) Artillery. Indirect artillery fire is planned to isolate objectives, to prevent reinforcement and resupply, to neutralize known and suspected CPs and OPs, and to suppress enemy defenders. Urbanized terrain requires that most indirect artillery fire use a high-angle trajectory.

(b) Mortars. Mortars are the most responsive indirect-fire weapon for the urban environment. They can be employed to hit targets of opportunity at the close ranges that are typical of combat in built-up areas.

(c) **Other.** Urban conflict is conducive to innovation. Many direct fire weapons can be employed in the indirect fire mode. Indirect fire weapons may also be effective at clearing the tops of buildings using variable-timed fuses.

(2) Direct Fire.

(a) **Armor.** Tanks are normally task organized with mechanized units for protection and security operations. The commander can employ tanks to take advantage of their long-range lethality, high-speed mobility, and survivability. They can be used outside the built-up area to cover high-speed armor avenues of approach. Tanks are normally employed in this role during the isolation phase. Tanks also support by fire the assault to seize a foothold and may support attacks to seize objectives within the built-up area. In MOUT, tanks can also be organized into special assault teams. The tank cannon's direct fire is very effective against structures. (Figure 2-9 on page 2-22 and Appendix B)

(b) **Howitzers.** Artillery rounds delivered by direct fire can be very effective for destroying targets in buildings. When used in this manner, the mobility, flexibility, responsiveness, and survivability of gun crews may be reduced. Artillery used in the direct fire role normally use HE shells.

(c) **Infantry.** Direct-fire systems, mainly machine guns, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapons (SMAWs), and AT4s—are initially employed to support the seizure of a foothold. The positioning of antitank weapons in buildings must allow enough space for the effects of backblasts. Antitank weapons have limited effectiveness when neutralizing targets behind walls. Designed primarily as armor penetrators, they neutralize a target only if that

Figure 2-9. Tank Direct-Fire Support Within the Built-Up Area

target is located directly behind the point of impact. Consideration must be given to weapons with minimum arming distances. Many of these factors can combine to limit the effects of weapons in the urban environment.

(d) **Aviation.** The vertical nature of large urban areas may block the pilot's line of sight with the target unless careful consideration is given to inbound headings and altitudes. Plan attack headings to take advantage of large open areas and street axis. Friendly ground forces must be clearly distinguishable from targets. The use of

smoke, visible or infrared strobes, or other visual devices must be effectively employed by ground forces and clearly understood by friendly aircraft.

e. Logistics. Logistics support in urban operations should be timely, flexible, and responsive. Logistics planners, both in the supported units and the CSSE, should be fully integrated in the planning process. The final logistics plan must be thoroughly coordinated with the scheme of maneuver. Units may need special equipment such as ropes, grappling hooks, ladders, sandbags, and wire; medical supplies must be readied in anticipation to support increased casualties; and additional supplies must be prestocked. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on logistics and urban warfare, and MCWP 4-1, *Tactical Logistics*, for additional planning considerations.)

f. Force Protection. Force protection encompasses all those measures that preserve the fighting potential of the command. It is integrated throughout all the warfighting functions. It does not entail security operations alone. It involves the continuous implementation of active and passive measures by all units during all phases of an operation.

Some particular active and passive measures in MOUT include:

- Manmade structures in the urban environment provide cover and concealment for both the attacker and defender.
- Lines of communication can be more easily interrupted due to multiple avenues of approach.
- All units must be prepared to implement force protection in a 3-dimensional environment.
- Proximity of civilian population makes identification of non-combatants more difficult.
- ROE may be more restrictive
- Snipers and man-portable shoulder launched air defense missiles are usually more difficult to detect.